Abstract: The social contract in Egypt has changed dramatically five times in the past decade. Mubarak made substantial amendments in 2005 and 2007, the 
Introduction
One of the major constitutional philosophies is that a constitution is a mutual social contract between the ruler and the people. 1 In Egypt, however, the contemporary constitutional philosophy is based on a unilateral social contract between the ruler and the people. President Nasser promulgated the 1956 highlight the gap between de facto (practice of political regimes) and de jure (constitutional rights). 10 This is the case in particular with major laws that have never undergone any substantial amendments, such as the 1948 Civil Law and the 1937 Penal Code. 11 Despite all these constitutions, the judiciary still applies laws that do not reflect the different social contracts that each constitution includes. 12 The inability of the judiciary to face such discrepancies has a major effect on issues such as freedom, transparency and property protection. Additionally, the 1973 Judicial Authority Law (JAL) does not reflect the current social contract. The JAL was set for reform after the 2014 Constitution. The current 1973 JAL reflects the 1971 constitutional philosophy. Even its two amendments of 2005 and 2007 were superseded by two amendments to the 1973 JAL. Consequently, this research argues that the call for judicial reform should be revived to face contemporary challenges. The scope of this research lies on the contemporary social, economical, political and legal challenges that the judiciary -both judges and judicial institutionshave failed to solve. 13 The judiciary is not the source of the problems Egypt is facing.
Nonetheless, the judiciary still fails to effectively address social, economic, political and legal problems the Egyptian society is facing. 14 Judicial reform is the best way to tackle societal challenges. This research aims to draw the connection between these challenges and judicial reform, as well as to establish the cause for judicial reform. Moreover, this research addresses some of the major internal challenges (such as institutional transparency) 15 and the failure of the judiciary to adequately respond to external challenges (such as the protection of freedoms and the fight against corruption). 16 It proposes a call for judicial reform after its suspension following the 2013 Military Coup. 17 This is considered an initial step to effectively address these challenges. 18 It urges the Egyptian as well as the Arab legal community to reform their judicial laws. This research offers four major reasons for reform, which are social, economic, political and legal in nature. In the first section, the social aspect is embodied in the protection of freedoms, judicial transparency and judicial legitimacy. This section outlines the inability of the judiciary to protect three major freedoms, namely the freedom of expression, the freedom of assembly and the freedom of religion. It reveals the gap between constitutional rights and judicial practices. It also highlights issues such as the lack of transparency in the judiciary. This is the result of a lack of both legal and political judicial accountability. 19 If the judiciary lacks both legal and political transparency, the question of its legitimacy is pivotal. The second section is divided into two parts. The first deals with Independent Bodies and Regulatory Agencies (IBRA), and their inability to fight corruption in state and capital markets. The second issue reveals the role of the judiciary in the successive failures of the IBRA. 20 The third section deals with the role of the judiciary in political life. The political situation manifests two contradictory interests. The first is the prohibition of judges from participating in political life, while the second is the constitutional mandate requiring judges and courts to supervise elections. 21 The first role annuls the second. 22 The fourth section presents the legal reasons for judicial statistics. This data is sent monthly to the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and the Attorney General. None of this data is made available to the public. There is no public institution within the judiciary that releases judicial data in reference to the number or type of cases. This is a violation of Article 68/1 of the 2014 Constitution, which regulates access to information and official documents. It states that 'information, data, statistics and official documents are owned by the people. Disclosure thereof from various sources is a right guaranteed by the state to all citizens. The state shall provide and make them available to citizens with transparency.' 37 The lack of transparency within the judiciary takes on three forms. Firstly, the Attorney General has the ultimate authority to ban media coverage in certain cases to protect the confidentiality of those involved. 38 This right is criticized, given that the Attorney General is empowered with an authority that is undisputed and unverified by any national independent body. Between 2013 and 2015, the Attorney General banned the publication of 15 cases, all related to police or judicial violations. 39 Secondly, judges and prosecutors prepare statistics related to their districts, which are subsequently sent to both the MoJ and the Attorney General.
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They believe that the publication of such data leads to interference with the administration of justice, which is mainly the responsibility of the MoJ. 41 As a result, it is rare to come across public statements regarding popular cases, either from the judiciary or the PPO.
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There are two reasons for this lack of transparency within the judiciary: the lack of legal responsibility and the lack of political responsibility. In terms of legal responsibility, even though there is a constitutional mandate to ensure the transparency of the state agencies, the JAL and the judicial practice take a stand against this right. On the one hand, the 2014 Constitution stipulates that there should be a forum in which citizens can file complaints regarding access to public data being withheld. It also maintains that responsibility must be taken in cases of non-conformity. 46 On the other hand, the JAL protects the judicial administration from any redress sought by the public.
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Members of the public cannot force the judiciary to disclose such data. Article 84 of the JAL limits the right to complain against judicial administrative decisions, including the request to disclose judicial data, to judges and prosecutors. 48 The Judges' Circuit at the Cairo Court of Appeal, which is responsible for all cases relating to the annulment of judicial administrative decisions, will not hear any case related to a constitutional mandate unless the plaintiff is a judge or prosecutor. formulation of the JAL constitutes an obstacle in enforcing the constitutional right, resulting in its inapplicability. In terms of political responsibility, no responsibility falls to either the judiciary or the Attorney General when it comes to publishing judicial data.
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This is due to two reasons. Firstly, there is no consultation of the public in the appointment process of the SJC, the Minister of Justice or the Attorney General. As far as the SJC is concerned, all its seven members are appointed based on the principle of seniority. These seven members are the president of the Court of Cassation, the first two vice presidents of the Court of Cassation, the Cairo Court of Appeal president, the Alexandria Court of Appeal president, the Mansoura Court of Appeal president as well as the Attorney General. 51 For the Minister of Justice, there is a great ambivalence regarding this position, ie whether it is a purely executive authority, or somewhere between an executive and judicial authority. This has given rise to the term 'sovereign ministries. competent authority is the SJC. Previously, the President of the Republic was the competent authority to appoint the Attorney General. At the time, the political accountability of the Attorney General was part of the executive accountability. The recent transfer of the appointment power from the President of the Republic to the SJC, however, turned a blind eye to the political accountability issues of the Attorney General. 56 Hence, a reformulation of the appointment process of the SJC, the Minister of Justice and the Attorney General must be addressed in the upcoming JAL. Secondly, there is an issue of sensitivity among the executive in dealing with the SJC, the Minister of Justice or the Attorney General. While the MoJ is a member of the Cabinet, the Prime Minister cannot request that data be made available to the public. 57 This is because the Cabinet fears executive interference in judicial affairs. 58 As a result, both legal and political responsibilities of the judiciary must be established. The JAL can work on establishing the legal responsibility of the judiciary. The political responsibility is part of judicial legitimacy, which also needs to be addressed.
Judicial legitimacy
The question of judicial legitimacy refers to the source of the judicial authority.
There are three forms of authority: the King in the monarchic system, God in the theocratic system, and the people in the republic system. In the first two systems, the judge either rules 'in the name of the King' or 'in the name of God.' 59 No doubts are raised regarding the source of the judge's legitimacy. It is hard to dispute the authority of the judge in these systems. 60 In Egypt, during the monocracy period, judges settled their judgments pursuant to the source of legitimacy, that being the King. eras, the concept of the people became even more vague than during Nasser's era. 69 Instead of rectifying the concept of the people to reflect a democratic form of government, Sadat and Mubarak maintained their authority over the judicial appointment process. The 2014 Constitution granted the judiciary full independence in the appointment process. 70 The judiciary is the competent authority for appointing judges. Even though such an act represents -in the judges' view -a protection of their judicial independence, it lacks any form of checks-and-balances between judiciary, executive and legislative. 71 As a result, the definition of the people, who are the purported source of the judge's legitimacy, is still not clear. It also raises the question as to who members are accountable to if they consider themselves the source of legitimacy. rates on a daily basis. 77 The CB has failed to offer foreign currency on a free market basis. The discrepancies between the two markets reached up to 10 % in early 2016, and 60 % in late 2016. 78 Additionally, the recent decision to limit foreign currency bank deposits to $10,000 a day and $50,000 a month for companies greatly restricts export potential. 79 There is a growing crisis in Egypt's financial market. Judge Genena was the first -and last -IBRA director to be impeached under this law. This step was taken following his statement about corruption levels in Egypt. He stated that the level of state corruption is estimated to have exceeded EGP 600 billion (USD 95 billion) during the period between 2012 and 2015. 93 He also stated that the CAO was in possession of all the documents required to prove this level of corruption. 94 Al-Sisi suspended him for making these statements. He was subsequently impeached, and his vice president Badawi took over. The judiciary was not able to protect Genena against such an unconstitutional law. This is due to personal and institutional conflicts with Genena, who blamed the judiciary for being part of the state corruption. He presented corruption cases against the Judges' Club and its ex-president Al-Zend. 95 He also stated that the CAO was in possession of documents incriminating Judge Al-Zend for claiming public land below the market value. As a result, there are many pending cases regarding these allegations that have yet to be settled. Secondly, the judiciary has failed to build any corruption cases except that of ex-President Mubarak. 96 This case is known as the 'Presidential Palaces Case.'
In this case, Mubarak was convicted of embezzlement for using public funds to renovate personal presidential palaces. 97 The for the sub-committees in the Damanhour Governorate, came together to prove that the election was indeed fraudulent.
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On 25 November 2005, the Judges' Club formed a Fact-Finding Committee. The committee investigated al-Zaini's allegations of electoral fraud. The committee started with contacting the 160 judges who supervised the Damanhour Governorate sub-committees. It requested a copy of the reports that they submitted to the Primary Electoral Committee and was able to secure 137 out of a total of 160 reports (one report = one judge). The committee found that the governmental candidate had won only 8,606 votes, while the other independent candidate had obtained 24,611 votes. As a result, it announced the governmental candidate had lost the elections.
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The committee had no formal powers, since it had not been established by either the Supreme Electoral Committee SEC or the MoJ. When the committee sent its report to the SEC and the MoJ, the Attorney General started investigations against al-Zaini and the 160 judges who had exposed the fraud. As for the MoJ, it transferred the case to the inspection department within the Ministry to punish the judges who had exposed the fraud. As a result, judges found themselves having to choose between two options. Firstly, if they respected the JAL's stand of prohibiting any political participation, they would be considered accomplices in the election fraud. Secondly, if they condemned the fraud, they would be charged with political participation in violation of the JAL. The majority of judges thus chose the second option.
Full judicial supervision has gone through two stages. Firstly, the Mubarak regime did not wish to continue with the impeachment process of the previous judges. In 2007, Mubarak called for a major constitutional amendment of 34 articles, which included Article 88 regarding full election supervision. The 2007 amendment of Article 88 reflects the old governmental interpretation of the article. It limits judicial supervision to the general electoral committees only, while the sub-committees remain under executive supervision. The only election under the new amendment was in 2010, which was nullified in 2011 for outrageous election fraud. Secondly, two months after the swearing in of the new parliament, the January 25 Revolution broke out. Participants in the Revolution demanded full judicial supervision of elections. 116 People agreed that the elections should not be in the hands of the executive, due to the previous history of election fraud. The request was based on the SCC ruling of 'one box, one judge.' As a result, the 2011 Constitutional referendum was under full judicial supervision. The 2014 Constitution maintains full judicial supervision until 2024.
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After that, the election supervision will fall to the National Electoral Commission NEC, and its director will be the chief justice of the Court of Cassation. 118 As for members of the election sub-committees, Article 210/1
mandates 'voting and counting of votes in referenda and elections run by the Commission is administered by its affiliated members under the overall supervision of the Board.' 119 The current status of the NEC is in favor of bringing back previous practices of election fraud. In order to replace the judiciary, strong bodies are required to make that shift from judicial supervision to an NEC. The judiciary is likely to maintain its role of supervising the election if the newly appointed commission is not fully successful or in the event of a collapse of the current regime. The former case would occur if the Al-Sisi regime remained in power and it was incapable of building an independent NEC. The latter case is likely to occur in the event of a collapse of the regime. The 2014 Constitution was drawn up excluding Islamist 120 and liberal politicians. 121 Hence, judges are more likely to be engaged in the political arena as long as such an NEC is not in effect. 122 The previous process of election fraud, judicial election supervision, judicial political participation and independent electoral committee is illustrated in Figure 1 .
Legal reasons for reform

Judicial law and internal issues
There are four major internal issues that the new JAL has to address effectively to ensure justice. These issues are: the interference of the MoJ in the judiciary, the judicial budget, judicial immunity and inequality in judicial appointment. Firstly, the improper influence on judicial decision-making, in the majority of cases, takes on two forms. Initially, the MoJ authority enjoys the ultimate authority over the appointment of the primary court's chief justice, who has the authority to assign judges to certain circuits. 123 The MoJ's legal right has been commonly and continuously abused. Each court has circuits that are specialized in various types of cases, like high-value commercial cases, or cases of a political nature. These cases are labeled 'sensitive' due to the nature of the parties involved in them. High-profile circuits are assigned to certain judges. 124 In 2012, Judge Mahmoud Shokri was the judge assigned to a case entitled 'illegal foreign fund against NGOs.' He was forced to resign from the case because he refused to respond to a request by the president of the Cairo Court of Appeal, Judge Abdel Moez Ibrahim. 125 The case was assigned to one of the judges in the technical office of the court. 126 As a consequence of this action, some judges lobbied to have Ibrahim dismissed, but their endeavors proved unsuccessful. 127 Besides, the MoJ has the ultimate power over the judicial inspection department, which is also a legal right. The 2014 Constitution gives the judiciary the right to regulate the accountability rules of its members. 128 The problem with the inspection department and the MoJ lies in the arbitrary nature of their decisions. Many judges supported the coup, while others supported exPresident Mohamed Morsi. Even though both groups have committed the same violation of the judicial authority law that bans any political participation of the judiciary, the inspection department impeached many of the judges who supported ex-President Mohamed Morsi, but overlooked the offense committed by those supporting the military coup.
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Secondly, the independent judicial budget reflects the independence of the judiciary from the executive authority while a transparent budget reflects an accountable judiciary. 130 However, although the judiciary has an independent budget, it has never been made public. 131 Full independence of the judicial budget was granted to the judiciary in 2008 after judges fought for the independence of their budget. 132 Once granted, they overlooked the judicial accountability aspect of their budget. 133 There were many proposals, prohibiting the budget from being made public. 134 These proposals finally reached a compromise in that the legislative would discuss the budget of the judiciary while maintaining it hidden from the public. 135 This rule applies to the SCC, the State Council 136 and the ordinary judiciary.
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Thirdly, judicial immunity, globally, protects judges from civil damages that result from their judgments.
138 This is limited to civil damages with no reference to criminal liability. 139 However, judicial immunity in Egypt covers both civil and criminal liabilities. As far as civil immunity is concerned, there are two types of civil accountability. The first is related to the judicial work of both judges and prosecutors. The general rule in this type of civil accountability is that judges are immune, while their accountability is an exception, as will be discussed in the following paragraphs. Article 494 of the Civil Procedure Law grants judges and prosecutors legal immunity from any civil damages that may arise from their work.
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The second type of civil accountability applies to non-judicial actions and is called Non-Judicial Civil Liability (NJCL). In theory, judges should not derive any form of civil immunity from their non-judicial work. The JAL does not regulate such form of NJCL of judges and prosecutors. Despite this, the Judicial Inspection Department (JID) has developed certain practices for NJCL, leading to comprehensive civil immunity for judges and prosecutors in reality. On the one hand, the JID must express its consent for any civil procedures to be launched against a certain judge. Without this consent, the plaintiff will not be able to sue a judge or a prosecutor in court. On the other hand, the JID cannot on the draft laws governing their affairs.' As for the army, Article 203 states the national defense council is 'responsible for looking into matters pertaining to the methods of ensuring the safety and security of the country, for discussing the armed forces' budget, which is incorporated as a single figure in the state budget.' 135 Ibid. 136 ibid, Article 191 states Supreme Constitutional Court 'has an independent budget whose items are all discussed by the House of Representatives. After it is approved, it is incorporated in the state budget as a single figure.' 137 Ibid, Article 184 states 'all judicial bodies administer their own affairs. Each has an independent budget, whose items are all discussed by the House of Representatives. After approving each budget, it is incorporated in the state budget as a single figure, and their opinion is consulted on the draft laws governing their affairs.' 138 Vicki Jackson, 'Judicial Independence: Structure, Context, Attitude' in Anja Seibert-Fohr (n 130) 52. 139 ibid. 140 Judges and prosecutors have to tackle all the cases, as long as they have a legal cause. If any plaintiff claims that certain judge or prosecutor committees one of the previous two exceptions, the plaintiff can resort to the competent Court of Appeals. The Court assigns the case to a special circuit to determine the virtue of the plaintiff claim. take any civil action against a judge. If the JID believes that there is NJCL, it will transfer the case to the competent civil court. The court will then hear all parties, including the judge. In other cases, if the JID cannot find any cause for NJCL, the JID will not transfer the case to the competent civil court. As a result, the plaintiff in the non-judicial civil case will not have his/her case heard.
NJCL jeopardizes the trust in the judiciary in general, especially in judges and prosecutors. It is legally unacceptable to add an extra judicial barrier with the aim of protecting certain classes in society. If a plaintiff claims that a judge has refrained from paying the rent, the plaintiff must first resort to the JID to obtain approval to sue the judge. The JID has thus imposed an extra-judicial procedure on the plaintiff to be able to resort to the 'natural justice.' Neither the CPL nor the JAL regulates non-judicial civil liability. The practice of the JID, however, has helped develop a form of immunity for judges. As a result, there is now a need to abolish non-judicial civil immunity.
As for criminal immunity, the 2014 Constitution and the JAL provide judicial immunity to all judicial institutions, including the SCC, and the ordinary and the administrative judiciary. 141 The 1972 JAL mandates such immunity to judges and prosecutors to protect them from the executive authority. Judges and prosecutors enjoy a special status regarding their criminal liability, especially arrest, search and seizure procedures. 142 No criminal action can be initiated against judges unless through a special judicial committee. This committee includes chief judges of the Court of Cassation, the Cairo Court of Appeal, the Alexandria Court of Appeal, and the Attorney General. There are two exceptions to this rule. Firstly, both the JID and the SJC permit criminal procedures to be launched against a judge or prosecutor. The SJC has to issue an arrest warrant or authorize the process of investigation, search or seizure. 143 Secondly, if a judge or a prosecutor is caught engaging in illegal conduct, a judicial investigator or police officer can arrest said judge or prosecutor. 144 In this case, the Attorney General must notify the SJC of the issue within 24 hours, and decide on whether to arrest the judge or to release him on bail.
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The rules of criminal immunity need to be redefined to reflect their real objective. 146 The rules of criminal immunity should not be extended to include a This statement was considered to be the first official statement regarding this practice. In 2013, more than 114 out of 475 appointees within the prosecution bureau were the relatives of judges. 158 In 2014, this percentage increased from 25 % to 35 %. 159 
Consequences of inefficient judicial education and training
The question of the validity of two or more laws that regulate the same legal behavior reveals two different drawbacks. In common law countries, this is a frequent problem. In the US, the Supreme Court has recognized the prosecution right to choose between two laws, whichever the prosecutor prefers. In civil law countries, the existence of two or more rules that govern one behavior is considered a legal problem. This is due to the codification nature of the law, which ensures the right of parties in legal predication. 160 It has been argued that Article 2 of the Egyptian Civil law states that 'a provision of a law can only be repealed by a subsequent law expressly providing for such repeal, or containing a provision inconsistent with a provision of the former law or regulating anew a matter previously regulated by a former law.' However, the judiciary repeals such rules. The public prosecution would still apply any of the two laws, unless the law did explicitly repeal the previous law. This problem exists in Egypt not only due to the codification nature of the 1937 Penal Code, but also due to the lack of efficient legal training for both judges and prosecutors. 161 The following table includes five examples of two contradicting laws. The first column presents the name of the crime and the other two columns illustrate two different punishments for the same act.
Conclusion
The 2013 Military Coup succeeded in suspending all calls for judicial reform under the guise of security concerns. The Egyptian judicial system, however, faces an interconnected web of serious problems. This research attempts to answer the question as to why judicial institutions are in need of reform. It lists the judicial failures in facing serious economic, social, legal and political challenges. The contemporary challenges facing Egypt are not secluded from the judicial challenges. Legal activists, including lawyers, judges and NGO members, have long called for reform. This research endeavors to shed light on the importance of judicial reform in Egypt. The inability of the judiciary to respond to ongoing challenges continues to prevent the progress of society as a whole. Strong governmental institutions need an independent and accountable judiciary to reinforce the law. The research presents these challenges and the role of the judiciary in protecting freedoms, fighting corruption and ensuring transparency. The judiciary is facing a crisis that is obstructing any effective progress of the economy.
